Priya Jaiswal is a distinguished authority in banking policy and financial regulation, currently serving as a lead advisor on market analysis and international business trends. With her deep background in portfolio management and systemic risk, she has become a pivotal voice in the dialogue between government regulators and private financial institutions. Our discussion focuses on the Federal Reserve’s latest multi-agency initiative to combat the escalating surge of payment fraud, exploring how new collaborative frameworks and standardized data protocols aim to fortify the global financial system against increasingly sophisticated criminal networks.
How will the new collaboration between the Federal Reserve, the FCC, and the Treasury Department fundamentally change current data-sharing practices, and what specific cross-sector solutions are being prioritized to stay ahead of increasingly sophisticated criminal organizations?
This partnership represents a shift from reactive, siloed defenses to a proactive, unified front that bridges the gap between telecommunications and financial oversight. By bringing the FCC into the fold alongside the Treasury, we are finally acknowledging that modern fraud doesn’t just happen at the bank teller window; it begins with a spoofed text or a fraudulent call. We are prioritizing cross-sector solutions that allow for real-time intelligence exchange, ensuring that a threat detected by one agency is immediately flagged across the entire ecosystem. To track our success, we will rely on metrics such as the reduction in the total volume of fraudulent transactions and the response time between a reported scam and the freezing of illicitly moved funds. It is about creating a “robust” environment where criminals find no safe harbor in the gaps between different regulatory jurisdictions.
Current fraud classification models often use inconsistent terms like “online shopping fraud” versus “imposter scams.” How would a standardized vocabulary help regulators and banks measure the severity of these threats, and what practical steps are necessary to implement this common language across the entire financial sector?
When banks and regulators speak different languages, the data we collect becomes fragmented and nearly impossible to aggregate for a high-level strategic response. If one institution classifies a loss as an “imposter scam” while another calls it “online shopping fraud,” we lose the ability to accurately gauge the severity and frequency of specific criminal tactics. Establishing a common vocabulary is the foundational step toward building a reliable heatmap of where the financial system is most vulnerable. Practically, this requires the Federal Reserve and agencies like the FDIC and OCC to issue a unified reporting framework that every financial institution must adopt. Once we have this shared terminology, we can deploy more effective prevention tools because we will finally be measuring the exact same threats with the same yardstick.
As criminals increasingly utilize AI tools to target consumers, what specific gaps in existing regulations must be addressed to protect the financial system, and how can agencies ensure these rules remain robust enough for future threats without stifling payment innovation?
The most glaring gap in our current regulatory landscape is the speed at which AI-driven scams can scale, often outstripping the manual verification processes still utilized by many smaller institutions. We must examine whether our regulations address modern fraud that leverages deepfakes and automated social engineering, as these threats are more relentless than traditional methods. The challenge lies in a delicate trade-off: if we implement overly rigid authentication hurdles, we risk slowing down the frictionless payments that consumers demand and that drive economic growth. To stay robust, our rules must move away from static checkboxes and toward dynamic, risk-based assessments that can evolve as AI capabilities change. This ensures we are protecting the system safely and securely without forcing the industry back into the “paper-and-ink” era of slow transactions.
Regulatory agencies have analyzed hundreds of public comments regarding payment mitigation strategies. Based on that feedback, what are the primary concerns raised by financial firms regarding current fraud-prevention efforts, and how should those insights shape the agenda for upcoming public-private roundtable discussions?
After reviewing more than 250 comments submitted to the Fed, FDIC, and OCC, a clear theme has emerged: financial firms are deeply concerned about the lack of liability clarity and the difficulty of maintaining privacy while sharing data. Many banks feel they are fighting an uphill battle against organized crime while being tethered by regulations that were designed for a less digital age. These insights are directly shaping our roundtable agenda, where we will focus on how the government can provide better “top-down” intelligence to help private firms. We aren’t just looking for feedback; we are looking for a roadmap to refine how we mitigate check fraud and other persistent threats. These discussions will bridge the gap between the policy makers in Washington and the frontline security officers who deal with these attacks every single day.
Coordination between banks, social media platforms, and telecommunications companies is often cited as a critical defense strategy. What lessons can the United States learn from international models to improve this multi-sector coordination, and how can law enforcement better integrate with these private-sector security efforts?
The United States can learn a great deal from international models that have mandated “zero-trust” ecosystems where social media platforms and telcos share the responsibility for fraud prevention alongside banks. Currently, criminals use social media to recruit victims and telecommunications to execute the scam, yet the financial institution is often left holding the bag for the final transaction. By integrating law enforcement more deeply into private-sector security efforts, we can move beyond just blocking transactions to actually identifying and prosecuting the threat actors. This requires a level of coordination where a red flag on a social media platform can be instantly cross-referenced with a suspicious bank transfer. We need to create a “sophisticated and organized” defense that mirrors the relentless nature of the criminals we are pursuing.
What is your forecast for payment fraud?
I expect that while the sophistication of fraudulent attacks will continue to rise due to AI-driven tools, we are entering a period where the “walls” between sectors will finally come down, significantly increasing our detection rates. Over the next few years, I forecast a transition where the financial industry moves toward a “shared intelligence” model, significantly reducing the success rate of traditional scams like check fraud and imposter schemes. However, the battle will likely shift toward more complex identity-theft scenarios, making biometric and behavior-based security protocols the standard rather than the exception. Success will ultimately be defined by how quickly we can turn the “250 public comments” and roundtable discussions of today into the binding, cross-sector regulations of tomorrow. My outlook is one of cautious optimism, provided we maintain the momentum of this current multi-agency collaboration.
